The economics of intergenerational relations faces two problems : the shortcomings of market transactions, which occur only between contemporary agents, and the effects of time irreversibilities. This note analyses the role of the State as the representative of future generations, taking first a normative point of view, and dealing then with two specific approaches : generational accounting, leading Kotlikoff to conclude, unilaterally, against the selfishness of elder generations ; and Becker's cooperative scheme between the generations, the families and the State, which rests on the alleged benefits of education and parental altruism towards children. An attempt to reconciliate these two approaches should then hark back to Mauss' ambivalence of any gift or transfer, involving a double relation, of benevolent sharing but also of agonistic domination.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) in its series DELTA Working Papers with number
2001-15.
Length: Date of creation: 2001 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in Démographie et économie : compléments - Paris : Conseil d'analyse économique, 2002, pp. 241-256 Handle: RePEc:del:abcdef:2001-15
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