Corruption and Competition in Public Market Auctions
AbstractThis paper investigates the effect of corruption on competition in government procurement auctions. Our assumption is that the bureaucrat (i.e. the agent that administers the market), if corrupt, may provide a favor in exchange for a bribe.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) in its series DELTA Working Papers with number 2000-01.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
AUCTIONS ; COMPETITION ; CORRUPTION;
Other versions of this item:
- Compte, Olivier & Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane & Verdier, Thierry, 2000. "Corruption And Competition In Public Market Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2434, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Daniel Kaufmann & Pedro C. Vicente, 2011.
Economics and Politics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(2), pages 195-219, 07.
- Lee, Joon-Suk, 2008. "Favoritism in asymmetric procurement auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1407-1424, November.
- Þevket Alper Koç, 2008. "Effects Of Asymmetry On Ex Ante Corruption At Auctions," Bogazici Journal of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 22(1+2), pages 17-33.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.