This paper investigates the effect of corruption on competition in government procurement auctions. Our assumption is that the bureaucrat (i.e. the agent that administers the market), if corrupt, may provide a favor in exchange for a bribe.
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Paper provided by DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) in its series DELTA Working Papers with number
2000-01.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
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Yvan Lengwiler & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2005.
"Bid Rigging. An Analysis of Corruption in Auctions,"
Discussion Papers
39, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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