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Static Multi-Criteria Model of Investing in Innovative Projects on a Set of Coalitional Partitions

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  • X. V. Grigorieva
  • Oleg A. Malafeyev
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    Abstract

    Static multi-criteria problem of investing in innovative projects on a set of coalitional partitions finding means compromise vector (one or more) of investment programs, where each component is an investment program of the corresponding innovative project. The search of compromise vector is made under coalitional interaction of all participants in innovative projects. In the process of solving this problem several game problems with different coalitional partitions are considered. As the principles of optimality, Pareto optimum, Nash arbitration scheme, Shapley value, compromise solution are used.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade in its series DEGIT Conference Papers with number c016_059.

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    Length: 9 pages
    Date of creation: Sep 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:deg:conpap:c016_059

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    Keywords: coalitional games; Pareto optimality; a compromise solution.;

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