Regionalism and Federalism : A Comparative Analysis of the Regulation of Economic Tensions between Regions by Canadian and American Federal Intergovernmental Transfer Programmes
AbstractRegionalization is a contradictory process meaning both subnational fragmentation of territorial states and their supranational integration at a larger scale. In this paper federalism, as a division of sovereignty between several orders of government within the same political system, is conceived as an institution designed to regulate regionalization. But federal pacts are subject to two symmetrical risks: either, a risk of a centralizing drift towards a unitary state; or a risk of disintegrating into as many sovereign states as previous federated units. Thus, in the first section of the paper, we define a 'true' federal system as a political order where an institutional device permanently tackles the problem of self-conservation of the federal principle. Then, in the second section, we show that self-conservation of a federal system or its evolution towards centralization or dissolution, are not first order dependent on economic issues, but on specific institutional forms that rule the game of political and social actors. To demonstrate this we take a comparative view of equalization programmes for tax revenues which distinguish Canadian federalism from its US counterpart. For these programmes channel competition between governments on political grounds and participate in the self-reproduction of the federal covenant. On the contrary, a lack of equalization liberates economic competition between federal states--tax war, social dumping--and leaves the ground free for centralization or dissolution of the federation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/9672.
Date of creation: Sep 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 1999, Vol. 23, no. 3. pp. 479-512.Length: 33 pages
Canada; Régulation; Fédéralisme; Gouvernement fédéral; États-Unis;
Other versions of this item:
- Bruno Théret, 1999. "Regionalism and Federalism: a Comparative Analysis of the Regulation of Economic Tensions between Regions by Canadian and American Federal Intergovernmental Transfer Programmes," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 479-512, 09.
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
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- Kristina Babich & Daniel Béland, 2007. "Creating the Canada/Quebec Pension Plans: An Historical and Political Analysis," Social and Economic Dimensions of an Aging Population Research Papers 223, McMaster University.
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