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Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Case

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  • Forges, Françoise
  • Vida, Péter

Abstract

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly fin nitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely fi nite), direct, cheap talk.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/8159.

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Date of creation: Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Theoretical Economics, 2013, Vol. 8, no. 1. pp. 95-123.Length: 28 pages
Handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/8159

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Keywords: Bayesian game; pre-play communication; cheap talk; communication equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; Two Player;

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References

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  27. Vida, Péter & Āzacis, Helmuts, 2013. "A detail-free mediator," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 101-115.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2012. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham 05-08rrr, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  2. Vida, Péter & Āzacis, Helmuts, 2013. "A detail-free mediator," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 101-115.
  3. Laruelle, Annick & Iñarra García, María Elena & Zuazo Garín, Peio, 2012. "Games with perceptions," IKERLANAK, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I Ikerlanak;2012-64, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
  4. Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian, 2010. "A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms," Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics michael_peters-2010-17, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Oct 2013.

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