Natural and Industrial Disasters : Land Use and Insurance
AbstractUrbanization in exposed areas increases the cost of disasters. For industrial risks, potential victims raise ﬁrms’ liabilities. For natural risks, overexposure by some undermines mutualization. Land use policy (particularly exclusion zones) and insurance shape urbanization, but their efficiency is limited by hazard-map precision. Map-based discrimination being politically sensitive, we identify an operation of map redrawing that increases the welfare of all. Climate change and population growth increase risk. We exhibit realistic cases where exclusion zones shrink as risk rises. We disentangle the competing eﬀects at play. Results are established for alternative distributions of bargaining power between households, mayor and ﬁrm.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/7845.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Cahiers de la Chaire Finance et Développement Durable, 2011
natural disasters; industrial disasters; insurance; land use regulation; hazard maps;
Other versions of this item:
- Céline Grislain-Letrémy & Bertrand Villeneuve, 2011. "Natural and Industrial Disasters : Land Use and Insurance," Working Papers 2011-32, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
- R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
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