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The Governance of Contracts: Empirical Evidence on Technology Licensing Agreements

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  • Chaserant, Camille
  • Coeurderoy, Régis
  • Brousseau, Eric

Abstract

This paper provides new evidence on the contractual governance of technology licensing agreements. Using an international sample of licensing contracts, we explore how contracts are designed to deal with specific contractual risks. In particular, we comparatively assess the influences of transaction attributes, institutional frameworks, and strategic considerations on the creation of licenses. Empirical results reveal that contractual clauses for governance are crafted independently. This leads to a discussion of complementarities between contractual components, which are frequently assumed in theory. Furthermore, our results are certainly amongst the first to provide econometric evidence on the pervasive influence of private institutions on the trading of technology.

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File URL: http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/bitstream/123456789/7117/1/the%20governance%20of%20contracts%20-%20Brousseau.PDF
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/7117.

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Date of creation: Jun 2007
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Publication status: Published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, 2007, Vol. 163, no. 2. pp. 205-235.Length: 30 pages
Handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/7117

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Related research

Keywords: Technology Licensing Agreements; Patents; Market for Technologies; Transaction Costs; Governance Mechanism;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Giebe, Thomas & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2007. "License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 199, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  2. Marco Furlotti, 2007. "There is more to contracts than incompleteness: a review and assessment of empirical research on inter-firm contract design," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 61-99, March.
  3. Jae-Seung Han & Sang-Yong Lee, 2013. "The impact of technology transfer contract on a firm’s market value in Korea," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 38(5), pages 651-674, October.

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