Too Few Cooks Spoil the Broth : Division of Labor and Directed Production
AbstractHow can a manager inﬂuence workers’ activity, while knowing little about it ? This paper examines a situation where production requires several tasks, and the manager wants to direct production to achieve a preferred allocation of effort across tasks. However, the effort that is required for each task cannot be observed, and the production result is the only indicator of worker activity. This paper illustrates that in this situation, the manager cannot implement the preferred allocation with a single worker. On the other hand, the manager is able to implement the preferred allocation by inducing a game among several workers. Gains to workers from collusion may be eliminated by an ability-dependent, but potentially inefﬁcient, task assignment. These ﬁndings provide a new explanation for the division of labor, and bureaucratic features such as “over”- specialization and “wrong” task allocation.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/6986.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2008, Vol. 8, no. 1
Specialization; job design; moral hazard; multitasking;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Felipe Balmaceda, 2012.
"On the Optimality of One-size-fits-all Contracts: The Limited Liability Case,"
Documentos de Trabajo
291, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Felipe Balmaceda, 2013. "On the Optimality of One-size-fits-all Contracts: The Limited Liability Case," Working Papers 39, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
- Chen, Bo, 2012. "All-or-nothing payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 133-142.
- Schöttner, Anja & Kragl, Jenny, 2013.
"Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design,"
Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order
79941, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Jenny Kragl & Anja Schöttner, 2012. "Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-36, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
- Christian Espinosa & Juan Gorigoitía & Carlos Maquieira, 2012. "Nonlinear behaviour of EMBI index:the case of eastern European countries," Working Papers 37, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandre Faure).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.