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3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side

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  • Renault, Jérôme

Abstract

We study the existence of uniform equilibria for three-player repeated games with lack of information on one side and perfect observation. If there are only two states of nature, a completely revealing or a joint plan equilibrium always exists. This is not the case for larger spaces of states.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/6538.

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Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, Vol. 30, no. 2. pp. 221-245.Length: 24 pages
Handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/6538

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Related research

Keywords: repeated games; incomplete information; lack of information on one side; 3 players; uniform equilibrium; existence of equilibria;

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Cited by:
  1. Renault, Jerome & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2005. "A folk theorem for minority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 208-230, November.
  2. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November.
  3. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
  4. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 124-156, April.
  5. Koessler, Frédéric & Forges, Françoise, 2008. "Multistage communication with and without verifiable types," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University 123456789/1121, Paris Dauphine University.
  6. Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan & Hörner, Johannes, 2009. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Les Cahiers de Recherche 921, HEC Paris.

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