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Secure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlation

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  • Gossner, Olivier
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    Abstract

    Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria are useful notions to understand the strategic effects of information and communication. Between these two models, a protocol generates information through communication. We define a secure protocol as a protocol from which no individual may have strategic incentives to deviate and characterize these protocols.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/6244.

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    Date of creation: 1998
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 1998, Vol. 83, no. 1. pp. 69-89.Length: 20 pages
    Handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/6244

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    Related research

    Keywords: communication; information; equilibria;

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    Cited by:
    1. Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2010. "A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 189-193, May.
    2. Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions," Working Papers 2005-10, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    3. Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2003. "Information and Its Value in Zero-Sum Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0312003, EconWPA.
    4. Heller, Yuval, 2005. "A minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," MPRA Paper 7716, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Feb 2008.
    5. Vida, Péter & Azacis, Helmuts, 2012. "A Detail-Free Mediator," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    6. Olivier Gossner, 1996. "Comparison of information structures," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 169, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    7. Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University 123456789/6115, Paris Dauphine University.
    8. Peter Vida, 2005. "A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case," IEHAS Discussion Papers, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 0511, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
    9. Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2003. "What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0312005, EconWPA.
    10. Kalai, Adam Tauman & Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud & Samet, Dov, 2010. "A commitment folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 127-137, May.
    11. Hannu Vartiainen, 2009. "A Simple Model of Secure Public Communication," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 67(1), pages 101-122, July.
    12. Adam Tauman Kalai & Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 2007. "Voluntary Commitments Lead to Efficiency," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1444, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    13. Indrajit Ray, 2002. "Multiple Equilibrium Problem and Non-Canonical Correlation Devices," Working Papers 2002-24, Brown University, Department of Economics.

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