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Efficacité des structures de contrôle et enracinement des dirigeants

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  • Alexandre, Hervé
  • Paquerot, Mathieu

Abstract

In the theoretical framework of corporate governance this article studies the efficiency of the control exerted by the ownership structure and the board of directors on managers. The confrontation of entrenchment theory and agency theory allows to determine the necessary conditions of the controller's efficiency. The ownership structure and the board of directors rarely unite all these conditions. Tests realized with the bootstrap method corroborate the entrenchment theory hypotheses and reject partially the arguments of agency theory.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/6186.

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Date of creation: Jun 2000
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Publication status: Published in Finance contrôle stratégie, 2000, Vol. 3, no. 2. pp. 5-29.Length: 24 pages
Handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/6186

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Keywords: gouvernement d'entreprise; théorie de l’agence; théorie de l'enracinement; structure de propriété; conseil d'administration.; corporate governance; agency theory; entrenchment theory; ownership structure; board of directors;

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  1. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  2. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-90, June.
  3. Gérard Charreaux, 1997. "L'entreprise publique est-elle nécessairement moins efficace?," Working Papers CREGO 0970901, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  4. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Scholarly Articles 3606237, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  5. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1997. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," NBER Working Papers 6274, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Denis, David J. & Denis, Diane K. & Sarin, Atulya, 1997. "Ownership structure and top executive turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 193-221, August.
  7. Gérard Charreaux, 1991. "Structure de propriété, relation d'agence et performance financière," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(3), pages 521-552.
  8. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 123-139, November.
  9. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," NBER Working Papers 6625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  11. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1990. " Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 31-48, March.
  12. Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, . "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 08-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  13. Castanias, Richard P. & Helfat, Constance E., 1992. "Managerial and windfall rents in the market for corporate control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 153-184, July.
  14. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
  15. Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R., 1996. "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(03), pages 377-397, September.
  16. Agrawal, Anup & Mandelker, Gershon N., 1990. "Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(02), pages 143-161, June.
  17. Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, . "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 8-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  18. Edlin, Aaron S & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1995. "Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1301-12, December.
  19. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1988. "Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 7-20, Winter.
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Cited by:
  1. Mehdi Nekhili & Ines Fakhfakh, 2006. "Les Relations Entre Les Mecanismes De Gouvernement Et L'Indice De Divulgation Volontaire D'Informations : Etude Clinique De Deux Entreprises Tunisiennes," Post-Print halshs-00558233, HAL.
  2. Bouaziz, Zied & Triki, Mohamed, 2012. "L’impact du conseil d’administration sur la performance financière des entreprises Tunisiennes
    [The impact of the Board of directors on the financial performance of Tunisian companies]
    ," MPRA Paper 38672, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Mehdi Nekhili & Afifa Wali Siala & Dhikra Chebbi, 2009. "Free cash flow, gouvernance et politique financière des entreprises françaises," Working Papers CREGO 1090102, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  4. Hentati Fakher & Bouri Abdelfettah, 2012. "Board of directors and financial decisions of Tunisian firms," African Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 1(1), pages 101-112.
  5. Fatma Tifafi & Dominique Dufour, 2006. "Une analyse de la présence d'administrateurs indépendants au sein du conseil d'administration : contrôle ou conseil ?," Post-Print halshs-00558255, HAL.
  6. Rim Zouari-Hadiji & Ghazi Zouari, 2010. "Gouvernance interne et investissement en R&D : une comparaison internationale," Working Papers CREGO 1100102, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  7. Mouna Mrad & Slaheddine Hallara, 2014. "The Relationship Between the Board of Directors and the Performance/Value Creation in a Context of Privatization: The Case of French Companies," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 83-108, March.
  8. Vigliano, Marie-Hélène, 2007. "Contrôle exercé par le Conseil d’administration et Rémunération des dirigeants : réplication de la recherche de Boyd (1994) au contexte français," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/2306, Paris Dauphine University.
  9. Patrice Charlier & Jean-Baptiste Cartier, 2012. "Les particularités de la société en commandite par actions au regard des conflits d'agence," Post-Print halshs-00807573, HAL.
  10. Djaoudath Alidou, 2011. "Les augmentations de capital réservées aux salariés en France - Employee Equity Issue:Evidence from France," Working Papers CREGO 1110603, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  11. Wiem Elmanaa Madani & Wafa Khlif, 2005. "Effets De La Structure De Propriete Sur La Performance Comptable : Etude Empirique Sur Les Entreprises Tunisiennes Indistruelles Non Cotees," Post-Print halshs-00581192, HAL.
  12. Karima Bouaiss & Christine Marsal, 2009. "Les mécanismes internes de gouvernance dans les banques:un état de l'art," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 12(1), pages 93-126, March.
  13. Pascal Dumontier & Sonda Chtourou & Soumaya Ayedi, 2006. "La qualité de l'audit externe et les mécanismes de gouvernance des entreprises : Une étude empirique menée dans le contexte tunisien," Post-Print halshs-00548115, HAL.
  14. Makram Chemangui, 2005. "La Problématique De Mesure De La Qualité D'Audit : Proposition D'Une Approche De Conception," Post-Print halshs-00581155, HAL.

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