On Two-Player Repeated Games with Lack of Information on One Side and State-Independent Signalling
AbstractWe consider two-person undiscounted repeated games with lack of information on one side and state-independent signalling and prove the existence of a "joint plan" uniform equilibrium.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/6109.
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2000, Vol. 25, no. 4. pp. 552-572.Length: 20 pages
Repeated games; incomplete information; imperfect monitoring; uniform equilibrium; existence of equilibria;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jerome Renault & Sergio Scarlatti & Marco Scarsini, 2003.
"A folk theorem for minority games,"
ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series
10-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- Frédéric Koessler & Françoise Forges, 2008.
"Multistage Communication With And Without Verifiable Types,"
International Game Theory Review (IGTR),
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(02), pages 145-164.
- Frederic Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2006. "Multistage communication with and without verifiable types," THEMA Working Papers 2006-14, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004.
"Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November.
- Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6103, Paris Dauphine University.
- Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandre Faure).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.