Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games
AbstractWe study the existence of uniform correlated equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games. The correlation devices that we use are either autonomous (they base their choice of signal on previous signals, but not on previous states or actions) or stationary (their choice is independent of any data and is drawn according to the same probability distribution at every stage). We prove that any n-player stochastic game admits an autonomous correlated equilibrium payoff. When the game is positive and recursive, a stationary correlated equilibrium payoff exists.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/6019.
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, Vol. 38, no. 2. pp. 362-399.Length: 37 pages
stochastic games; correlated equilibrium; positive recursive games;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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