Politics and the Geographic Allocation of Public Funds in a Semi-Democracy. The Case of Ghana, 1996-2004
AbstractThe body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the behavior of government in semi-democratic African countries. Empirical and theoretical political economic papers find that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing districts. Our results, however, suggest that the opposite was true of Ghana. We observe that pro-government districts received less public investment when the NDC was in power. We posit that this finding is partially driven by the government's will to curry favor with opposition politicians. Indeed, in addition to pursuing its electoral objectives, the government of an emerging democracy may fear political instability and keep the lid on potential unrest by bargaining with opposition leaders. Our analysis also shows that, when controlling for votes and other covariates (including wealth, urbanization and density), public goods allocation is not driven by ethnic group targeting either. _________________________________ La littÃ©rature Ã©conomique portant sur la comprÃ©hension des comportements distributifs des gouvernements de pays dÃ©mocratiques peut Ã©chouer Ã comprendre les mÃ©canismes distributifs Ã lâoeuvre dans des pays semi-dÃ©mocratiques africains. Les travaux thÃ©oriques et empiriques dâÃ©conomie politique trouvent gÃ©nÃ©ralement que les partis au pouvoir ciblent les fonds publics soit vers les populations qui les soutiennent fortement, soit vers les endroits oÃ¹ les rÃ©sultats des Ã©lections antÃ©rieures sont en ballotage sÃ©rÃ©. Cependant, nous montrons le contraire dans le cas du Ghana. Nous observons que, lorsque le parti NDC Ã©tait au pouvoir, les districts les plus pro-gouvernementaux ont reÃ§us moins de biens publics que les autres districts. De mÃªme nous ne dÃ©celons pas de ciblage vers les districts en ballotage. Nous soutenons quâun tel phÃ©nomÃ¨ne est en partie du au fait que le gouvernement, pour rester en place, souhaite avoir les bonnes grÃ¢ces de lâopposition. Câest ain
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/5746.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in DIAL Document de travail, 2011
Economie politique; Biens publics; Ghana; Politics; Elections; Public goods;
Other versions of this item:
- Pierre André & Sandrine Mesplé-Somps, 2011. "Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy. The case of Ghana, 1996-2004," Working Papers DT/2011/04, DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation).
- André, Pierre & Mesplé-Somps, Sandrine, 2011. "Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy: The case of Ghana, 1996-2004," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011 6, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
- R53 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Public Facility Location Analysis; Public Investment and Capital Stock
- O55 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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