Politique énergétique : aspects stratégiques de la question des approvisionnements
AbstractThis article treats energy taxation principles in the light of the need to optimise supply by non-EU suppliers. Our model distinguishes and evaluates the three terms of an optimum tax: budget, environment and strategy. Their values depend on technological data (output) and habits (consumption) as well as the balance of power between the Community and its suppliers. The proposed scenarios can be used to discuss and suggest improvements in the energy policy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/5373.
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economie et Prévision, 2003, no. 158. pp. 73-88.Length: 15 pages
taxation; energy; environment; fiscalité; énergie; environnement;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
- Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
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