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Politique énergétique : aspects stratégiques de la question des approvisionnements

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  • Creti, Anna
  • Villeneuve, Bertrand

Abstract

This article treats energy taxation principles in the light of the need to optimise supply by non-EU suppliers. Our model distinguishes and evaluates the three terms of an optimum tax: budget, environment and strategy. Their values depend on technological data (output) and habits (consumption) as well as the balance of power between the Community and its suppliers. The proposed scenarios can be used to discuss and suggest improvements in the energy policy.

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File URL: http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/bitstream/123456789/5373/1/pol_energetique.PDF
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/5373.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Publication status: Published in Economie et Prévision, 2003, no. 158. pp. 73-88.Length: 15 pages
Handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/5373

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Keywords: taxation; energy; environment; fiscalité; énergie; environnement;

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  1. Myles, Gareth D., 1989. "Ramsey tax rules for economies with imperfect competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 95-115, February.
  2. Lawrence Goulder, 1995. "Environmental taxation and the double dividend: A reader's guide," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 157-183, August.
  3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
  4. Myles, G. D., 1987. "Tax design in the presence of imperfect competition : An example," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 367-378, December.
  5. Guesnerie Roger & Laffont Jean-jacques, 1978. "Taxing price makers," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 7806, CEPREMAP.
  6. Alan D. Woodland, 1993. "A Micro-Econometric Analysis of the Industrial Demand for Energy in NSW," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 57-90.
  7. Wirl, Franz, 1993. "Energy pricing when externalities are taxed," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 255-270, September.
  8. Pearce, David W, 1991. "The Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to Global Warming," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(407), pages 938-48, July.
  9. J. A. Mirrlees, 1976. "Optimal Tax Theory: A Synthesis," Working papers 176, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  10. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
  11. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  12. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1995. "Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1321-35, November.
  13. Griffin, James M, 1977. "Inter-fuel Substitution Possibilities: A Translog Application to Intercountry Data," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 18(3), pages 755-70, October.
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