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Communication in Bayesian games: Overview of work on implementing mediators in game theory

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  • Forges, Françoise

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Paper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/5279.

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Date of creation: Jun 2010
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Handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/5279

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Keywords: game theory; Bayesian games;

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References

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  1. FORGES, Françoise, . "Can sunspots replace a mediator?," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -825, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January.
  3. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
  4. HART, Sergiu, . "Nonzerosum two-person repeated games with incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -636, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Forges, F., 1984. "An approach to communication equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1984035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," EIEF Working Papers Series 1110, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised May 2011.
  7. Amparo Urbano & Jose Vila, 2004. "Computationally restricted unmediated talk under incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 283-320, January.
  8. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
  9. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
  10. Dino Gerardi & Roger B. Myerson, 2005. "Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1542, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  11. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
  12. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
  13. Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, 1996. "Coalition-Proof Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 80-112, November.
  14. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp284, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
  15. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2004. "The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 147-179, August.
  16. Amparo Urbano & Jose E. Vila, 2002. "Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1893-1927, September.
  17. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 375-98, May.
  18. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1998. "Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by "Cheap" Pre-play Procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 108-122, May.
  19. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-58, March.
  20. Ashlagi, Itai & Monderer, Dov & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2009. "Mediators in position auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 2-21, September.
  21. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
  22. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1996. "Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 113-128, November.
  23. Green, Jerry R. & Stokey, Nancy L., 2007. "A two-person game of information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 90-104, July.
  24. Vijay Krishna, R., 2007. "Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 584-592, January.
  25. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, December.
  26. Maria Goltsman & Johannes Horner & Gregory Pavlov & Francesco Squintani, 2007. "Arbitration, Mediation and Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1445, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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