L’informel est-il une forme de fraude fiscale ? Une analyse micro-économétrique de la fraude fiscale des micro-entreprises à Madagascar
AbstractSince de Soto’s work, the entrepreneur’s choice to enter or not the formal sector is usually compared to a tax evasion behaviour. This characterisation seems to be weakened by many recent surveys where it appears that fiscal rules are generally unknown by managers. This article tries to assess the accuracy of tax determinants on the formal-informal dualism. For that purpose a tax evasion model is build and then tested on data from a survey undertaken in Antananarivo. Our regressions show that the propensity of an enterprise to belong to the formal sector can be explained by fiscal variables.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/4929.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Revue d'économie du développement, 2001, no. 3. pp. 25-50.Length: 25 pages
Tax Evasion; Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
- C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
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