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Anti-Poverty Transfers without Riots in Tunisia

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  • Muller, Christophe

Abstract

We draw some lessons from the Tunisian experience of social reforms and associated civil conflict. Our main interest is the riots that occurred after subsidy cuts and their possible substitution of price subsidies by direct cash transfers. We propose new welfare indicators apt to assess policy reforms in situations of fragile states. Finally, using micro level data we show that the plausible policy decision depend on parameters describing the balance between poverty and program exclusion risk. In the Tunisian case, only a much larger weight put on poverty relatively to exclusion could bring the decision maker to substitute the in force price subsidies with direct cash transfers, for fear of social unrest.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/4334.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Publication status: Published in DIAL Document de travail, 2007
Handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/4334

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Keywords: Tunisie; normes de travail; salaires; emploi; zones franches; Social transfers; Targeting; Tunisia; North Africa; Social conflicts; Poverty;

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Cited by:
  1. Mohammad Abu-Zaineh & Habiba Romdhane & Bruno Ventelou & Jean-Paul Moatti & Arfa Chokri, 2013. "Appraising financial protection in health: the case of Tunisia," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 73-93, March.

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