Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

How hard is it to Control Sequential Elections via the Agenda?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Conitzer, Vincent
  • Lang, Jérôme
  • Xia, Lirong
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Voting on multiple related issues is an important and difficult problem. The key difficulty is that the number of alternatives is exponential in the number of issues, and hence it is infeasible for the agents to rank all the alternatives. A simple approach is to vote on the issues one at a time, in sequence; however, a drawback is that the outcome may depend on the order in which the issues are voted upon and decided, which gives the chairperson some control over the outcome of the election because she can strategically determine the order. While this is undeniably a negative feature of sequential voting, in this paper we temper this judgment by showing that the chairperson’s control problem is, in most cases, computationally hard.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/bitstream/123456789/3899/1/IJCAI09-028.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/3899.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: Dec 2009
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/3899

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.dauphine.fr/en/welcome.html
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Voting;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Plott, Charles R & Levine, Michael E, 1978. "A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(1), pages 146-60, March.
    2. Steven J. Brams & William S. Zwicker & D. Marc Kilgour, 1998. "The paradox of multiple elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 211-236.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/3899. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandre Faure).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.