Correlated equilibria and communication in games
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/171.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Computational Complexity. Theory, Techniques, and Applications, . pp. 295-704.Length: 409 pages
Analyse bayésienne; Théorie des jeux; Information privée;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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- Myerson, Roger B., 1994. "Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 827-847 Elsevier.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1998. "Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by "Cheap" Pre-play Procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 108-122, May.
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