Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
AbstractThis paper studies the set of equilibria that can be achieved by adding general communication systems to Bayesian games in which some information can be certified or, equivalently, in which players’ types are partially verifiable. Certifiability of information is formalized by a set of available reports for each player that varies with the true state of the world. Given these state-dependent sets of reports, we characterize canonical equilibria for which generalized versions of the revelation principle are valid. Communication equilibria and associated canonical representations are obtained as special cases when no information can be certified.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/168.
Date of creation: Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2005, Vol. 41, no. 7. pp. 793-811.Length: 18 pages
Information privée; Théorie des jeux; Analyse bayésienne;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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