Share repurchase regulations: do firms play by the rules?
AbstractOpen market share repurchases are strictly regulated to prevent companies from profiting from insider information. We examine compliance with these rules in France, where the mandatory disclosure of share repurchases provides detailed information on repurchases actually undertaken. Using a database containing 36,848 repurchases made by 352 French firms over the period 2000-2002, we show that very few firms fully comply with the regulations for all their buybacks. Non-compliance has an adverse effect on liquidity only for the smallest and least liquid firms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/1435.
Date of creation: Jun 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International Review of Law and Economics, 2009, Vol. 29, no. 2. pp. 81-96.Length: 15 pages
Open market share repurchases; Insider trading; Regulations; Liquidity;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
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- Foued Hamouda & Mounira Ben Arab, 2013. "Board of directors and insider trading with share repurchase programs," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 405-418, May.
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