Sitting on the fence: Pork - barrels and democratization under threat of conflict. The case of Ghana, 1996 - 2004
AbstractThis paper studies political competition in the case of a democratization process. We present an illustrative model describing political competition when the opposition threatens the stability of the country. In some cases, our model predicts the government should invest in opposition districts to avoid political agitation. This contrasts with existing literature on established democracies, where public funds usually target ruling, party supporters or electorally tight districts. We empirically observe the first democratic changeover in Ghana in 2000. Implement- ing a diff-in-diff strategy, we find that districts with a leading political party member appear to receive slightly more public funds when their party is not in charge. This phenomenon is found in urban areas and in areas that vote the most for this leading member’s party. Hence it occurs in places with the potential for political agitation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/12022.
Date of creation: Apr 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Thema Working Paper, 2013
Public goods; Elections; Politics; Ghana;
Other versions of this item:
- Pierre André & Sandrine Mesplé-Somps, 2013. "Sitting on the fence: Pork-barrels and democratization under threat of conflict. The case of Ghana, 1996 - 2004," THEMA Working Papers 2013-24, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- O55 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa
- R53 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Public Facility Location Analysis; Public Investment and Capital Stock
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AFR-2013-11-16 (Africa)
- NEP-ALL-2013-11-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-11-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2013-11-16 (Positive Political Economics)
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