Skin in the Game and Moral Hazard
AbstractWhat determines equilibrium securitization levels, and should they be regulated? To address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase asset quality, subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling ABS to rational investors. In equilibrium, all originators have low/zero retentions if they are financially constrained and/or prices are su¢ ciently informative. Asymmetric information lowers effort incentives in all equilibria. Effort is promoted by junior retentions, investor sophistication, and informative prices. Optimal regulation promotes effort while accounting for investor-level externalities. It entails either a menu of junior retentions or a single junior retention with size decreasing in price informativeness. Mandated market opacity is only optimal amongst regulations failing to induce originator effort.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/11540.
Date of creation: Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Cahiers de la Chaire Finance et Développement Durable, 2013
Securitization; skin in the game; risk-sharing; moral hazard;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-11-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-2013-11-16 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-CTA-2013-11-16 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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