Legal tradition and quality of institutions : is colonization by french law countries distinctive ?
AbstractRecent literature argues that legal traditions of nations, i.e. their belonging to the world of common law or civil law, are not neutral in terms of economic or institutional performance, especially with regard to key opportunities in developing countries out of poverty. We present the results of an exploratory exploitation of the “institutional profiles database” provided by DGTPE (French Ministry of Economy and Finance) and French Development Agency (survey 2009) supplemented by data on legal origin and other variables from La Porta et al. We highlight specificities of developing countries having inherited the French law (relative to those of English law). A reflection on political power and the state finds a strong contrast between the ideal-typical model of French law and the empirical findings. This contrast is consistent with the notion rather than real state in the former French colonies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/11440.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Criterio Libre, 2013, Vol. 11, no. 18. pp. 25-54.Length: 29 pages
Colonisation; Pays en voie de développement; Influence française; Droit;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O52 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Europe
- F54 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Colonialism; Imperialism; Postcolonialism
- B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Institutional; Evolutionary
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-11-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-HIS-2013-11-16 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-LAW-2013-11-16 (Law & Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mahoney, Paul G, 2001. "The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 503-25, Part I Ju.
- Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2004.
"Do Institutions Cause Growth?,"
Journal of Economic Growth,
Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 271-303, 09.
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