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Assurance maladie en Suisse : les assurances supplémentaires nuisent-elles à la concurrence sur l'assurance de base ?

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  • Dormont, Brigitte
  • Geoffard, Pierre-Yves
  • Lamiraud, Karine

Abstract

De nombreux pays ont introduit des mécanismes concurrentiels en assurance maladie, tout en instaurant une régulation pour éviter la sélection des risques et garantir une solidarité entre malades et bien portants. Le modèle de la « concurrence régulée » est ainsi appliqué pour l'assurance maladie de base en Suisse, aux Pays-Bas, en Allemagne, en Israël. Il inspire la réforme de l'assurance maladie aux États-Unis. Cet article analyse le fonctionnement d'un tel système en considérant le cas de la Suisse, où l'on s'intéresse aux interférences potentielles entre le marché des assurances supplémentaires et celui de l'assurance de base. L'organisation actuelle de l'assurance maladie en France diffère de celle du système suisse. Mais la question d'une régulation du marché des assurances complémentaires pourrait être posée à terme. Douze ans après l'introduction de la concurrence régulée, les résultats observés en Suisse sont décevants. Bien que les écarts de primes constatés entre les compagnies d'assurance soient très importants, la proportion d'assurés qui changent de caisse reste faible. Tout se passe comme si les assurés ne faisaient pas jouer la concurrence. Notre analyse montre que la faible mobilité des assurés résulte de la coexistence de deux marchés d'assurance maladie soumis à des règles différentes : le marché de l'assurance de base, où la sélection des risques est interdite, et celui de l'assurance supplémentaire, où elle est autorisée. Les estimations montrent que la propension à changer de caisse est beaucoup plus faible chez les détenteurs d'une assurance supplémentaire qui estiment que leur santé n'est pas excellente. Comme il est préférable pour des raisons pratiques d'avoir son assurance de base et son assurance supplémentaire dans la même caisse, il existe un lien de fait entre les deux marchés. Le droit de sélectionner les candidats à la souscription pour l'assurance supplémentaire nuit à la concurrence sur l'assurance de base.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/11294.

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Date of creation: May 2013
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Publication status: Published in Economie et statistique, 2013, no. 455-456. pp. 71-87.Length: 16 pages
Handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/11294

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Keywords: Économie de la santé; Assurance-maladie complémentaire; Assurance maladie;

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  1. Brigitte Dormont & Pierre-Yves Geoffard & Karine Lamiraud, 2009. "The influence of supplementary health insurance on switching behaviour: evidence from Swiss data," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(11), pages 1339-1356.
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