A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
AbstractThe set of all Bayesian–Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by making conditional commitments at the interim stage of a Bayesian game coincides with the set of all feasible, incentive compatible and interim individually rational payoffs of the Bayesian game. Furthermore, the various equilibrium payoffs, which are achieved by means of different commitment devices, are also the equilibrium payoffs of a universal, deterministic commitment game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/11052.
Date of creation: Mar 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, Vol. 78, no. 1. pp. 64-71.Length: 7 pages
Bayesian game; commitment; contract; incentive compatibility; interim individual rationality;
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- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
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