Industry Restructuring: A Case for Affirmative Action
AbstractWe analyze the trade-oﬀ faced by authorities envisaging a one-shot structural re-form in a capitalistic industry. A structure is modeled as (1) a sharing of productive capital at some time and (2) a sharing of scarce sites or any other non-reproducible assets. These two distinct dimensions of policy illustrate the importance of a dy-namic theory in which ﬁrms durably diﬀer in several respects. Though equalization of endowments and rights is theoretically optimal, realistic constraints force com-petition authorities to adopt second-best solutions. Aﬃrmative action here is the policy that recognizes the fact that, under certain circumstances, helping the dis-advantaged contributes maximally to social surplus.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/10217.
Date of creation: Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 2013, no. 109
Politique de la concurrence; accumulation de capacité; concurrence de Cournot; duopole asymétrique; régulation cohérente dans le temps; Competition policy; capacity accumulation; Cournot competition; asymmetric duopoly; regulatory consistency;
Other versions of this item:
- Bertrand VILLENEUVE & Vanessa Yanhua ZHANG, 2013. "Industry Restructuring : A Case for Affirmative Action," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 109-110, pages 8.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-11-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-11-16 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2013-11-16 (Industrial Organization)
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