The Case for International Emission Trade in the Absence of Cooperative Climate Policy
AbstractWe evaluate the efficacy of international trade in carbon emission permits when countries are guided strictly by their national self-interest. To do so, we construct a calibrated general equilibrium model that jointly describes the world economy and the strategic incentives that guide the design of national abatement policies. Countries' decisions about their participation in a trading system and about their initial permit endowment are made noncooperatively; so a priori it is not clear that permit trade will induce participation in international abatement agreements or that participation will result in significant environmental gains. Despite this, we find that emission trade agreements can be effective; that smaller groupings pairing developing and developed-world partners often perform better than agreements with larger rosters; and that general equilibrium responses play an important role in shaping these outcomes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL) in its series Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics with number 35491.
Date of creation: Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics . 194 (2008-10)
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Global warming; coalitions; general equilibrium; tradable permits;
Other versions of this item:
- Carbone, Jared C. & Helm, Carsten & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2009. "The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 266-280, November.
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
- F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
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