Uniformly Bounded Information and Social Choice
AbstractThe set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and there is a positive number β such that each pair of alternatives can be socially ordered without having to consult individual preference over a set with more than β alternatives then there are arbitrarily large finite subsets of X within which f is dictatorial when individual preferences are restricted to a rich subset of profiles.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number 49.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 31 Jan 2007
Date of revision:
chromatic graphs; generalized IIA; social welfare function;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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