Donald E. Campbell () (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary) Jerry S. Kelly () (Department of Economics, Syracuse University)
Abstract
The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and there is a positive number β such that each pair of alternatives can be socially ordered without having to consult individual preference over a set with more than β alternatives then there are arbitrarily large finite subsets of X within which f is dictatorial when individual preferences are restricted to a rich subset of profiles.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number
49.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Blau, Julian H, 1971.
"Arrow's Theorem with Weak Independence,"
Economica,
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 38(152), pages 413-20, November.
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