Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality: Countable Many Alternatives
AbstractFor a finite number of alternatives, in the presence of Pareto, non-dictatorship, full domain, and transitivity, an extremely weak independence condition is incompatible with each of anonymity and neutrality (Campbell and Kelly ). This paper explores how those results are affected when there are countably many alternatives.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number 43.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 11 Sep 2006
Date of revision:
Pareto; anonymity; neutrality;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-09-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2006-09-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2006-09-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-KNM-2006-09-16 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)
- NEP-MIC-2006-09-16 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
- Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2000. "Information and preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 3-24.
- Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2006. "Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality, but not IIA," Working Papers 38, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
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