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Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality: Countable Many Alternatives

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Author Info
Donald E. Campbell () (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary)
Jerry S. Kelly () (Department of Economics, Syracuse University)
Abstract

For a finite number of alternatives, in the presence of Pareto, non-dictatorship, full domain, and transitivity, an extremely weak independence condition is incompatible with each of anonymity and neutrality (Campbell and Kelly [2006]). This paper explores how those results are affected when there are countably many alternatives.

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File URL: http://www.wm.edu/economics/wp/cwm_wp43.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number 43.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 11 Sep 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cwm:wpaper:43

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Related research
Keywords: Pareto anonymity neutrality

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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  1. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2000. "Information and preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 3-24. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2006. "Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality, but not IIA," Working Papers 38, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary. [Downloadable!]
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