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Pareto, Anonymity, and Independence: Four Alternatives

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Author Info
Donald E. Campbell () (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary)
Jerry S. Kelly () (Department of Economics, Syracuse University)
Abstract

For four alternatives and an even number of individuals, we prove a conjecture in a companion paper: It is impossible for a social choice rule to satisfy all of (1) Pareto, (2) anonymity, (3) full domain, and (4) independence of some alternative, a relaxation of ArrowÕs IIA.

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File URL: http://www.wm.edu/economics/wp/cwm_wp39.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number 39.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 16 Aug 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cwm:wpaper:39

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Related research
Keywords: Pareto anonymity independence

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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  1. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2000. "Information and preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 3-24. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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