Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality, but not IIA

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Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality, but not IIA

Author Info

Donald E. Campbell () (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary)
Jerry S. Kelly () (Department of Economics, Syracuse University)

Abstract

In the presence of Pareto, non-dictatorship, full domain, and transitivity, an extremely weak independence condition disallows both anonymity and neutrality.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number 38.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 16 Aug 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cwm:wpaper:38

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2006-08-19 (All new papers)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Young, H. P., 1974. "An axiomatization of Borda's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-52, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Navin Aswal & Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2003. "Dictatorial domains," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 45-62, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Aswal, N. & Chatterji, S. & Sen, A,, 1999. "Dictatorial Domains," Papers 9940, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2000. "Information and preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 3-24. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hansson, Bengt & Sahlquist, Henrik, 1976. "A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 193-200, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2006. "Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality: Countable Many Alternatives," Working Papers 43, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary. [Downloadable!]

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