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Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality, but not IIA

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Author Info

  • Donald E. Campbell

    () (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary)

  • Jerry S. Kelly

    () (Department of Economics, Syracuse University)

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    Abstract

    In the presence of Pareto, non-dictatorship, full domain, and transitivity, an extremely weak independence condition disallows both anonymity and neutrality.

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    File URL: http://economics.wm.edu/wp/cwm_wp38.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number 38.

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    Length: 17 pages
    Date of creation: 16 Aug 2006
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:cwm:wpaper:38

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    Related research

    Keywords: Pareto; anonymity; neutrality;

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Coughlin, Peter, 1979. "A direct characterization of Black's first borda count," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 131-133.
    2. Hansson, Bengt & Sahlquist, Henrik, 1976. "A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 193-200, October.
    3. Young, H. P., 1974. "An axiomatization of Borda's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-52, September.
    4. Navin Aswal & Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2003. "Dictatorial domains," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 45-62, 08.
    5. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2000. "Information and preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 3-24.
    6. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
    7. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2002. "Impossibility theorems in the arrovian framework," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 35-94 Elsevier.
    8. Peter C. Fishburn, 1969. "Preferences, Summation, and Social Welfare Functions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 16(3), pages 179-186, November.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:
    1. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2006. "Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality: Countable Many Alternatives," Working Papers 43, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.

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