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Should You Turn Yourself In? The Consequences of Environmental Self-Policing

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Author Info
Sarah L. Stafford () (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary)
Abstract

Facilities that self-police under the Environmental Protection AgencyÕs Audit Policy are eligible for reduced penalties on disclosed violations. This paper investigates whether self- policing has additional consequences, in particular whether self-policing reduces future enforcement activity. Using data on U.S. hazardous waste enforcement and disclosures, I find that facilities that self-police are rewarded with a lower probability of inspection in the future, although facilities with good compliance records may receive a smaller benefit than facilities with poor records. Additionally, facilities that are inspected frequently are more likely to disclose than facilities that face a low probability of inspection. The results suggest that facilities may be able to strategically disclose in order to decrease future enforcement.

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File URL: http://www.wm.edu/economics/wp/cwm_wp27rev2.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number 27.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 23 Feb 2006
Date of revision: 13 Jun 2006
Handle: RePEc:cwm:wpaper:27

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Related research
Keywords: Self-Policing Enforcement Targeting Compliance Hazardous Waste

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 583-606, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Chris William Sanchirico & Alexander S. P. Pfaff, 2004. "Big Field, Small Potatoes: An Empirical Assessment of EPA's Self- Audit Policy," Public Economics 0403007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Innes, Robert, 1999. "Remediation and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 379-393, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Sarah L. Stafford, 2006. "Self-Policing in a Targeted Enforcement Regime," Working Papers 26, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary. [Downloadable!]
  5. Eric Helland, 1998. "The Enforcement Of Pollution Control Laws: Inspections, Violations, And Self-Reporting," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(1), pages 141-153, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Harrington, Winston, 1988. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 29-53, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Innes, Robert, 2001. "Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 239-56, April.
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  1. Sarah L. Stafford, 2006. "Self-Policing in a Targeted Enforcement Regime," Working Papers 26, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary. [Downloadable!]
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