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Games with Perceptive Commanders But Less Perceptive Subordinates

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Author Info
Martin Shubik () (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)

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Abstract

We introduce a model of the 2 x 2 games played by agents or subordinates of the players. We assume that each agent or subordinates of the players. We assume that each agent is not as perceptive as his commander in that he can make only two distinctions among the four outcomes whose value can be distinguished by the commanders.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d07a/d0733.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 733.

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Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Dec 1984
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:733

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Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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Related research
Keywords: Game theory; agents; commanders; subordinates;

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