Revelation of Information in Strategic Market Games: A Critique of Rational Expectations
AbstractWe criticize the R.E.E. approach to asymmetric information general equilibrium because it does not explain how information gets "into" the prices. This leads to well-known paradoxes. We suggest a multiperiod game instead, where the flow of information into and out of prices is explicitly modeled. In our game Nash equilibria (N.E.) (1) generalize Walrasian equilibria to asymmetric information; (2) (2) exist generically; (3) eliminate pure speculation; (4) allow prices to reveal information and markets to become more efficient over time; (5) are consistent with the weak efficient markets hypothesis that tracking past prices is not profitable; (6) yet always lead to higher utility for better informed agents (such as experts). Throughout the paper we use one concrete game. In the last section we prove that there are a broad range of games that would have the same properties.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 634R.
Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: 1982
Date of revision: Nov 1985
Publication status: Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (1987), 16: 105-137
Note: CFP 686.
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
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