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A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for the Nonemptiness of the Cores of Partitioning Games

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Author Info
Mamoru Kaneko (University of Tsukuba)

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Abstract

Let N be a finite set of players and let pi be a class of coalitions of N. We consider games with and without sidepayments such that only the coalitions in pi play essential roles but not the others. For an arbitrary pi, we get the class of all such games. The purpose of this note is to provide a necessary and sufficient condition with respect to pi for the nonemptiness of the cores of all games in the class.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d05b/d0566.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 566.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Nov 1980
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Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:566

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  1. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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