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A Closed Economic System with Production and Exchange Modelled as a Game of Strategy

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Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 429.

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Length: 77 pages
Date of creation: 1976
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (1977), 4: 253-287
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:429

Note: CFP 460.
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Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
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Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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Cited by:
  1. Martin Shubik, 1976. "Theory of Money and Financial Institutions. Part 34. A Multiperiod Trading Economy with Fiat Money, Bank Money and an Optimal Bankruptcy Rule," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 441, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Martin Shubik, 1980. "Perfect or Robust Noncooperative Equilibrium: A Search for the Philosophers Stone?," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 559, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. John Duffy & Alexander Matros & Ted Temzelides, 2008. "Competitive Behavior in Market Games: Evidence and Theory," Working Papers 366, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2009.
  4. Martin Shubik & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1982. "Approximate Cores of a General Class of Economies: Part II. Set-Up Costs and Firm Formation in Coalition Production Economies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 619, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  5. Pradeep Dubey & Martin Shubik, 1978. "A Theory of Money and Financial Institutions. Part 37. The Profit Maximizing Firm: Managers and Stockholders," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 483, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  6. Martin Shubik & Charles Wilson, 1976. "A Theory of Money and Financial Institutions. Part 30 (revised). The Optimal Bankruptcy Rule in a Trading Economy Using Fiat Money," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 424R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Alexander Matros & Ted Temzelides, 2004. "Evolution and Walrasian Behavior in Market Games," Game Theory and Information 0409009, EconWPA.

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