The Optimal Life of a Patent
AbstractOne of the important peculiarities of information is that it is expensive to produce but cheap to reproduce. How does a price system react to this phenomenon? One reaction will be to avoid the production of information altogether. Alternatively, firms may decide to keep their information to themselves. In other cases the price system breaks down into imperfect competition. All three of these laissez-faire reactions are inefficient and it may be argued that it is desirable to impose social controls like a patent system or government control on the market for information. In the present paper we discuss some economic aspects of a patent system.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 241.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Nov 1967
Date of revision:
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Reitzig, Markus, 2003. "What determines patent value?: Insights from the semiconductor industry," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 13-26, January.
- Hans Schedl & Guido von Scheffer & Dirk Loop & Holger Himmel & Sven Mussler, 2005. "Patente als Sicherheiten bei der Kreditvergabe," Ifo Schnelldienst, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 58(07), pages 21-31, 04.
- Fischer, Timo & Leidinger, Jan, 2014. "Testing patent value indicators on directly observed patent value—An empirical analysis of Ocean Tomo patent auctions," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 519-529.
- Markus Reitzig, 2004. "The private values of 'thickets' and 'fences': towards an updated picture of the use of patents across industries," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(5), pages 457-476.
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