An Analysis of the Dismal Theorem
AbstractIn a series of papers, Martin Weitzman has proposed a Dismal Theorem. The general idea is that, under limited conditions concerning the structure of uncertainty and preferences, society has an indefinitely large expected loss from high-consequence, low-probability events. Under such conditions, standard economic analysis cannot be applied. The present study is intended to put the Dismal Theorem in context and examine the range of its applicability, with an application to catastrophic climate change. I conclude that Weitzman makes an important point about selection of distributions in the analysis of decision-making under uncertainty. However, the conditions necessary for the Dismal Theorem to hold are limited and do not apply to a wide range of potential uncertain scenarios.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1686.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2009
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Other versions of this item:
- O13 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
- H43 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate
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- Dellink, Rob & Finus, Michael, 2012.
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- Hennlock, Magnus, 2009. "Robust Control in Global Warming Management: An Analytical Dynamic Integrated Assessment," Discussion Papers dp-09-19, Resources For the Future.
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