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A Note on Fairness, Power, Property, and Behind the Veil

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Abstract

An Axiomatization for Power and for Equity differ only in the addition of a Behind the Veil Axiom.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Shubik, 2006. "A Note on Fairness, Power, Property, and Behind the Veil," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1593, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1593
    Note: CFP 1230.
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Shubik, 2018. "Who Gets What, When, How? Power, Organization, Markets, Money and the Allocation of Resources," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 3018, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Martin Shubik, 2018. "The Paradox of Competition: Power, Markets, and Money - Who Gets What, When, How"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2118R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Martin Shubik, 2018. "Who Gets What, When, How" Power, Organization, Markets, Money and the Allocation of Resources," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2118, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Value; Behind the veil; Power; Equity; Ownership;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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