Randomized Sign Test for Dependent Observations on Discrete Choice under Risk
AbstractThis paper proposes nonparametric statistical procedures for analyzing discrete choice models of affective decision making. We make two contributions to the literature on behavioral economics. Namely, we propose a procedure for eliciting the existence of a Nash equilibrium in an intrapersonal, potential game as well as randomized sign tests for dependent observations on game-theoretic models of affective decision making. This methodology is illustrated in the context of a hypothetical experiment -- the Casino Game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1526.
Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2005
Date of revision:
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C12 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Hypothesis Testing: General
- C32 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models
- C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-07-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-DCM-2005-07-18 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-ECM-2005-07-18 (Econometrics)
- NEP-EXP-2005-07-18 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-FMK-2005-07-18 (Financial Markets)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Donald Brown & Rustam Ibragimov, 2005. "Sign Tests for Dependent Observations and Bounds for Path-Dependent Options," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2581, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Jul 2005.
- Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979.
"Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
7656, David K. Levine.
- Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-91, March.
- Donald J. Brown & Rustam Ibragimov, 2005. "Sign Tests for Dependent Observations and Bounds for Path-Dependent Options," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1518, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Chris Starmer, 2000. "Developments in Non-expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(2), pages 332-382, June.
- Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
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