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Randomized Sign Test for Dependent Observations on Discrete Choice under Risk

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Author Info

  • Anat Bracha
  • Jeremy Gray

    ()
    (Dept. of Psychology, Yale University)

  • Rustam Ibragimov
  • Boaz Nadler

    ()
    (Dept. of Mathematics, Yale University)

  • Dmitry Shapiro
  • Glena Ames

    ()
    (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)

  • Donald J. Brown

    ()
    (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)

Abstract

This paper proposes nonparametric statistical procedures for analyzing discrete choice models of affective decision making. We make two contributions to the literature on behavioral economics. Namely, we propose a procedure for eliciting the existence of a Nash equilibrium in an intrapersonal, potential game as well as randomized sign tests for dependent observations on game-theoretic models of affective decision making. This methodology is illustrated in the context of a hypothetical experiment -- the Casino Game.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1526.

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Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1526

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Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

Related research

Keywords: Behavioral economics; Affective decision making; Intrapersonal potential games; Randomized sign tests; Dependent observations; Adapted sequences; Martingale-difference sequences;

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References

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  1. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
  2. Donald J. Brown & Rustam Ibragimov, 2005. "Sign Tests for Dependent Observations and Bounds for Path-Dependent Options," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1518, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Donald Brown & Rustam Ibragimov, 2005. "Sign Tests for Dependent Observations and Bounds for Path-Dependent Options," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2581, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Jul 2005.
  4. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
  5. Chris Starmer, 2000. "Developments in Non-expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(2), pages 332-382, June.
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