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Flexibility as an Instrument in Digital Rights Management

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Author Info
Dirk Bergemann () (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
Thomas Eisenbach () (Dept. of Economics, University of Munich)
Joan Feigenbaum () (Dept. of Computer Science, Yale University)
Scott Shenker (ICSI and Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of California, Berkeley)

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Abstract

We consider the optimal design of flexible use in a digital-rights-management policy. The basic model considers a single distributor of digital goods and a continuum of consumers. Each consumer can acquire the digital good either as a licensed product or an unlicensed copy. The availability of (or access to) unlicensed copies is increasing both in the number of licensed copies and in the flexibility accorded to licensed copies. We thus analyze the optimal design of flexibility in the presence of unlicensed distribution channels (the "greynet"). We augment the basic model by introducing a “secure platform” that is required to use the digital good. We compare the optimal design of flexibility in the presence of a platform to the one without a platform. Finally, we analyze the equilibrium provision when platform and content are complimentary goods but are distributed and priced by different sellers.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1505.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1505

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Related research
Keywords: Digital Rights Management Platform Flexibility Piracy

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bakos, Yannis & Brynjolfsson, Erik & Lichtman, Douglas, 1999. "Shared Information Goods," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 117-55, April.
  2. Rafael Rob & Joel Waldfogel, 2004. "Piracy on the High C's: Music Downloading, Sales Displacement, and Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students," NBER Working Papers 10874, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Takeyama, Lisa N, 1994. "The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externalities," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2), pages 155-66, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Peter Biddle & Paul England & Marcus Peinado & Bryan Willman, 2003. "The Darknet and the Future of Content Distribution," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000636, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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