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Strategic Freedom, Constraint, and Symmetry in One-period Markets with Cash and Credit Payment

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Author Info
Martin Shubik () (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
Eric Smith (Santa Fe Institute)

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Abstract

In order to explain in a systematic way why certain combinations of market, financial, and legal structures may be intrinsic to certain capabilities to exchange real goods, we introduce criteria for abstracting the qualitative functions of markets. The criteria involve the number of strategic freedoms the combined institutions, considered as formalized strategic games, present to traders, the constraints they impose, and the symmetry with which those constraints are applied to the traders. We pay particular attention to what is required to make these "strategic market games" well-defined, and to make various solutions computable by the agents within the bounds on information and control they are assumed to have. As an application of these criteria, we present a complete taxonomy of the minimal one-period exchange economies with symmetric information and inside money. A natural hierarchy of market forms is observed to emerge, in which institutionally simpler markets are often found to be more suitable to fewer and less-diversified traders, while the institutionally richer markets only become functional as the size and diversity of their users gets large.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d14a/d1420.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1420.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: May 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1420

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Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
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Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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Related research
Keywords: Strategic market games; Clearinghouses; Credit evaluation; Default;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General

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Cited by:
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  1. Martin Shubik & Eric Smith, 2005. "Fiat Money and the Natural Scale of Government," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1509, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Thomas Quint & Martin Shubik, 2004. "A Consumable Money. An Elementary Discussion of Commodity Money, Fiat Money and Credit: Part I," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1455, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Eric Smith & Martin Shubik, 2005. "Commodity Money and the Valuation of Trade," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1510, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-4.


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