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Structure, Clearinghouses and Symmetry

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Abstract

We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry properties of the structure.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Shubik & Eric Smith, 2003. "Structure, Clearinghouses and Symmetry," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1419, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1419
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sorin, Sylvain, 1996. "Strategic Market Games with Exchange Rates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 431-446, May.
    2. Martin Shubik, 2000. "The Theory of Money," Working Papers 00-03-021, Santa Fe Institute.
    3. Dubey, Pradeep & Mas-Colell, Andreau & Shubik, Martin, 1980. "Efficiency properties of strategies market games: An axiomatic approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 339-362, April.
    4. Amir, Rabah & Sahi, Siddharta & Shubik, Martin & Yao, Shuntian, 1990. "A strategic market game with complete markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 126-143, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Juergen Huber & Martin Shubik & Shyam Sunder, 2009. "Default Penalty as a Disciplinary and Selection Mechanism in Presence of Multiple Equilibria," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1730, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic market games; Clearinghouses; Credit evaluation; Default;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General

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