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The Paradox of Disconnected Coalitions

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Author Info
Brams, S.J.
Jones, M.A.
Kilgour, D.M.

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Abstract

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File URL: http://www.econ.nyu.edu/cvstarr/working/1999/RR99-19.PDF
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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 99-19.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:99-19

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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 269 Mercer Street 7th Floor, New York, NY 10003
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Web page: http://www.nyu.edu/econ/cvstarr/index.html
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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 269 Mercer Street 7th Floor, New York, NY 10003
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Related research
Keywords: COALITION FORMATION DYNAMIC ANALYSIS SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS LEGISLATURES MILITARY ALLIANCES.

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Brams, S.J., 1995. "Game Theory and Emotions," Working Papers 95-23, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Demange, Gabrielle, 1994. "Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 45-58, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Chakravorti, Bhaskar, 1999. "Far-Sightedness and the Voting Paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 216-226, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Greenberg, Joseph & Weber, Shlomo, 1986. "Strong tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 101-117, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Greenberg Joseph & Weber Shlomo, 1993. "Stable Coalition Structures with a Unidimensional Set of Alternatives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 62-82, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Greenberg, J. & Weber, S., 1991. "Stable Coalition Structures with Unidimensional Set of Alternatives," Papers 9133, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
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  8. Brams, S.J. & Kilgour, D.M., 1998. "Fallback Bargaining," Working Papers 98-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Matthew O. Jackson & Boaz Moselle, 2000. "Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game," Grand Coalition 59, Grand Coalition Web Site. [Downloadable!]
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