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Competitive Fair Division

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Author Info
Brams, S.J.
Kilgour, D.M.

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Abstract

The analysis is developed in the context of the "housemates problem," in which the rent for a house (the bad) must be apportioned among several housemates, each of whom is entitled to receive one room (the good). Each housemate is assumed to have the same endowment, so the auction of rooms is a "relativized" one--only relative, not absolute, bids for each room matter. Other applications of the Gap Procedure, in which player endowments and entitlements may be different, or the procedure may be carried out in rounds, are discussed.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 99-05.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:99-05

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Related research
Keywords: EFFICIENCY AUCTIONS BIDDING

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Francis Su, . "Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 1999-10, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  2. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
  3. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Barbanel, J. B. & Brams, S. J., 2001. "Cake Division with Minimal Cuts: Envy-Free Procedures for 3 Person, 4 Persons, and Beyond," Working Papers 01-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Helmuts Azacis, 2004. "Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 623.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Carraro, Carlo & Marchiori, Carmen & Sgobbi, Alessandra, 2005. "Advances in negotiation theory : bargaining, coalitions, and fairness," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3642, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2005. "Course Bidding at Business Schools," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 618, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Brams, S. J. & Eldelman, P. H. & Fishburn, P. C., 2000. "Paradoxes of Fair Division," Working Papers 00-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  6. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2002. "Room assignment-rent division: A market approach," Discussion Papers 0102-11, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Claus-Jochen Haake & Matthias G. Raith & Francis Su, 2000. "Bidding for Envy-Freeness: A Procedural Approach to n-Player Fair Division Problems," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2000-47, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Haake,C., 2004. "Dividing by demanding : object division through market procedures," Working papers 359, University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
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