Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Education and Borrowing Constraints: Tests vs Prices

Contents:

Author Info

  • Fernandez, R.

Abstract

This paper examines the properties of exams and markets as alternative allocation devices under borrowing constraints. Exmas dominate markets in terms of matching efficiency. Whether aggregate consumption is greater under exams than under markets depends on the power of the exam technology; for a sufficiently powerful test, exams dominate markets in terms of aggregate consumption as well. The positive effects of income taxation are analyzed and the optimal allocation scheme when welath is observable is derived.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9381/RR98-17.PDF
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 98-17.

as in new window
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:98-17

Contact details of provider:
Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
Phone: (212) 998-8936
Fax: (212) 995-3932
Email:
Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
Email:

Related research

Keywords: EDUCATION ; MARKETS ; TESTS ; BORROWING;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Daron Acemoglu, 1995. "Matching, Heterogeneity and the Evolution of Income Distribution," Working papers 95-25, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  2. Raquel Fernandez & Jordi Gali, 1997. "To Each According To...? Markets, Tournaments, and the Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints," NBER Working Papers 5930, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Becker, Gary S & Tomes, Nigel, 1979. "An Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of Income and Intergenerational Mobility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1153-89, December.
  4. Fernandez, Raquel & Rogerson, Richard, 1996. "Income Distribution, Communities, and the Quality of Public Education," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 135-64, February.
  5. Cole, Harold L & Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1992. "Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1092-1125, December.
  6. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-46, July-Aug..
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Murat F. Iyigun & Andrew T. Levin, 2003. "What Determines Public Support for Affirmative Action?," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 69(3), pages 612-627, January.
  2. Jimmy Chan & Erik Eyster, 2002. "Admission Impossible? Self Interest and Affirmative Action," Economics Working Paper Archive 479, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  3. Murat F. Iyigun & Andrew T. Levin, 1998. "Macroeconomic implications of competitive college admissions," International Finance Discussion Papers 613, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:98-17

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anne Stubing).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.