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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 96-30.

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Length: 62 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:96-30

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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
Phone: (212) 998-8936
Fax: (212) 995-3932
Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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Related research

Keywords: LAW; VOTING; GAMES; GAME THEORY;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability

References listed on IDEAS
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1. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. T. Randolph Beard, 1990. "Bankruptcy and Care Choice," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(4), pages 626-634, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Eisenberg, Theodore, 1990. "Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 337-58, June.
4. Rasmusen, Eric & Ayres, Ian, 1993. "Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 309-43, June.
   Other versions:
   • Rasmusen, E., 1992. "Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law," Papers 92-022, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
5. Blume, Lawrence & Rubinfeld, Daniel L & Shapiro, Perry, 1984. "The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 99(1), pages 71-92, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1995. "An Economic Analysis of Takings," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 64-86, April.
7. Aaron S. Edlin., 1993. "Efficient Standards of Due Care: Should Courts Find More Parties Negligent Under Comparative Negligence?," Economics Working Papers 93-218, University of California at Berkeley.
   Other versions:
   • Edlin, Aaron S., 1994. "Efficient standards of due care: Should courts find more parties negligent under comparative negligence?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 21-34, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Veljanovski, Cento G, 1982. "The Coase Theorems and the Economic Theory of Markets and Law," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(1), pages 53-74.
9. Daughety, A. & Reinganum, J., 1991. "Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation," Working Papers 91-23, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
   Other versions:
   • Daughety, Adnrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1993. "Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 314-48, October.
10. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1987. "Fixed Price Versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation," NBER Working Papers 1817, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Polinsky, A Mitchell, 1987. "Fixed Price versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 27-46, Spring.
11. Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-52, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Raquel Fernandez & Jacob Glazer, 1989. "Striking for a Bargain Between Two Completely Informed Agents," NBER Working Papers 3108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1988. "The deterrent effects of settlements and trials," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 109-116, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Mitchell Polinsky, A., 1987. "Optimal liability when the injurer's information about the victim's loss is imperfect," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 139-147, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1988. "Optimal Liability when the Injurer's Information about the Victim's Loss is Imperfect," NBER Working Papers 2174, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Wittman, Donald, 1988. "Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 313-52, June.
15. Aivazian, Varouj A & Callen, Jeffrey L & Lipnowski, Irwin, 1987. "The Coase Theorem and Coalitional Stability," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 54(216), pages 517-20, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(3), pages 351-67, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. I.P.L. P'ng, 1983. "Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 539-550, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1990. "A letter to the editor on wage bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 232-236, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Harrison, Glenn W & McKee, Michael, 1985. "Experimental Evaluation of the Coase Theorem," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(3), pages 653-70, October.
20. Schwartz, Alan, 1993. "Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 595-632, April.
21. Avery Christopher & Zemsky Peter B., 1994. "Money Burning and Multiple Equilibria in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 154-168, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.