Balancing the Scales: Halakha, the Firm, and Information Asymmetries

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Balancing the Scales: Halakha, the Firm, and Information Asymmetries

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Prager, J.

Abstract

Sellers are typically better about product quality and sales practices than are purchasers, and might be tempted to exploit their superior knowledge to deceive buyers. Firms themselves, buyers, and third-parties attempt to level the playing field with a variety of confidence-building measures, including reputational signals, purchaser monitoring, and government regulations. This pragmatic approach has its echoes in Halakha --Jewish law-- which, too, was concerned about information asymmetries and which introduced countervailing measures.

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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 96-16.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:96-16

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Social Responsibility

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Bester, Helmut, 1993. "Bargaining versus Price Competition in Markets with Quality Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 278-88, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert, 1993. "The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 83-102, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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